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Abstract
Multi-agent networked control systems (NCSs) are often subject to model uncertainty and are limited by large communication
cost, associated with feedback of data between the system nodes. To provide robustness against model uncertainty and to reduce
the communication cost, this paper investigates the mixed H2/H∞ control problem for NCS under the sparsity constraint. First,
proximal alternating linearized minimization (PALM) is employed to solve the centralized social optimization where the agents
have the same optimization objective. Next, we investigate a sparsity-constrained noncooperative game, which accommodates
different control-performance criteria of different agents, and propose a best-response dynamics algorithm based on PALM that
converges to an approximate Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of this game. A special case of this game, where the agents
have the same H2 objective, produces a partially-distributed social optimization solution. We validate the proposed algorithms
using a network with unstable node dynamics and demonstrate the superiority of the proposed PALM-based method to a previously
investigated sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ controller.
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1Game-Theoretic Mixed H2/H∞ Control with
Sparsity Constraint for Multi-agent Networked
Control Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research on multi-agent networks has proposed
various methods for reducing communication cost for control
by using sparse H2 control designs [1]–[6]. However, most of
this work ignores the effects of model uncertainties, which are
bound to arise in most practical large-scale systems since the
network operating conditions and topology change frequently
over time. Even if the topology is fixed, the exact model
parameters are not always available to the designer. The sparse
control design in such cases must also be robust against the
uncertainties. Robust designs have been reported in several
recent papers such as [7]–[10] using H∞ control, which is
suitable for handling norm-bounded uncertainties in the system
dynamics. In particular, [8], [9] employ both H2 and H∞
control, thus balancing the H2 performance of the nominal
system and robustness objective. However, optimizing the H2
performance under the H∞ and sparsity constraints has not
been investigated by other researchers. Moreover, while a
global control performance cost was optimized, this metric
did not address the individual objectives of multiple agents
under uncertainty.
Control of NCS under uncertainties has received signifi-
cant attention recently in various domains, such as wide-area
control of power systems [2], multi-robot coordination, multi-
access broadcast channel, vehicle formation, and wireless
sensor networks [11], [12]. In these problems, game theory
becomes a powerful tool, with different control inputs modeled
as game players, where each player aims to optimize its
individual objective using an associated control policy. Differ-
ential games have been investigated for uncertain multi-agent
systems, and algorithms for finding an equilibrium point have
been proposed based on solving a set of coupled optimization
problems. The works [13], [14] extend Nash-type differential
game in [15] by finding robust Nash strategies while either
considering polytopic uncertainty or formulating uncertain
external disturbance as a fictitious player. The works [16]–[19]
model the uncertainty using stochastic differential equations,
and the Nash strategies are found by solving cross-coupled
matrix equations through necessary optimality conditions or
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Recently, reinforce-
ment learning has been applied to multi-agent control Nash
games when the system parameters are completely or partially
unknown [20]–[23]. However, these reported game-theoretic
designs did not address any sparsity constraint.
In this paper, we investigate controller designs for multi-
agent systems that aim to reduce H2 cost under H∞ and
sparsity constraints. Both social optimization and a nonconvex
game, where the H2-objectives of the agents are same and dif-
ferent, respectively, are investigated. We model our uncertainty
as a norm-bounded parameteric uncertainty that translates into
an H∞ constraint as in [9], [24]. We employ the proximal
alternating linearized minimization (PALM) [5], which has
been shown to be effective for optimization for nonconvex
nonsmooth problems [25] and was utilized in [5] in a sparsity-
constrained output-feedback co-design problem. First, a cen-
tralized sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ controller, which
represents the social optimization, is addressed. Preliminary
results on this topic were recently reported in our conference
paper [24], where we developed a centralized controller under
the sparsity and H∞ constraints using a greedy gradient sup-
port pursuit (GraSP) method [26]. However, the algorithm in
[24] requires the knowledge of an initial stabilizing feedback
gain that satisfies the sparsity constraint. We eliminate this
requirement and show the advantages of the PALM-based
controller in this paper over that in [24] in terms of the
quadratic H2-cost.
Next, we extend the proposed design to the multi-agent
scenario where each agent designs its own part of the feedback
matrix, subject to a shared global H∞-norm and sparsity
constraints. Since each agent has different individual cost,
the control design is modeled as a noncooperative game
with shared constraints. We develop a numerical algorithm
to find the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) [27] of
this game. The proposed algorithm has partially-distributed
computation, i.e., in the first stage, each player computes its
own feedback matrix while in the second stage, the sparse
links are chosen globally based on the results from the first
stage. Third, assuming all players of the game have the same
H2-optimization objective, we develop a potential game that
yields a partially-distributed implementation of the social op-
timization. We perform numerical simulations to demonstrate
the performance of the proposed algorithms and discuss their
convergence properties.
The main contributions of the paper can, therefore, be
summarized as:
• Development and analysis of a centralized, sparsity-
constrained mixed H2/H∞ controller for social optimiza-
tion of multi-agent systems with norm-bounded uncer-
tainty.
• Development of game-theoretic, partially-distributed al-
gorithms that aim to minimize the H2-norms of the
agents’ transfer functions under shared sparsity and H∞-
norm constraints.
2TABLE I: Notation
Term Definition
M0(0) Matrix M is positive definite (semidefinite)
M≺0(0) M is negative definite (semidefinite)
σmax(M) maximum singular value of M
||K||F Frobenius norm of the matrix K, defined by√
trace(KTK).
card(K) Cardinality of matrixK, defined by the number of nonzero
elements in K.
∇KJ(K) The gradient of the scalar function J(K) with respect to
the matrix K. Assuming K ∈ Rm×n, ∇KJ(K) is given
by a m × n matrix with the elements [∇KJ(K)]ij =
∂J/∂Kij .
[K]s The matrix obtained by preserving only the s largest-
magnitude entries of the matrix K and setting all other
entries to zero.
H2 norm The system H2 norm in the time domain is ||G||2 =(∫∞
0
[
trace(H(t)TH(t))
]
dt
)1/2, where H(t) is the
impulse response of the system.
H∞ norm The system H∞ norm ||G||∞ = supω σmax(G(jω)),
where G(jω) is the system transfer matrix.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model with parametric uncertainty and
develops a centralized PALM algorithm for social optimization
using sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ control. Section III
describes a multi-agent system with parametric uncertainty,
proposes a noncooperative game with shared sparsity and H∞
constraints, and develops partially-distributed numerical algo-
rithms for this game and for social optimization. Section IV
demonstrates effectiveness of the proposed algorithms using
numerical simulations, and discusses their complexities and
convergence properties. Section V discusses future directions
and concludes the paper.
Throughout the paper, matrices are denoted with boldface
capital letters. If M is a symmetric matrix, the upper block
matrices are sometimes denoted by ∗ to save space. Some
notation used is summarized in Table I.
II. PALM ALGORITHM FOR CENTRALIZED
SPARSITY-CONSTRAINED MIXED H2/H∞ CONTROL
A. System model and mixed H2/H∞ control
Consider the following linear time-invariant system with
model uncertainty:
x˙(t) = (A + ∆A)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aˆ
x(t) + (B + ∆B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bˆ
u(t) + B2w2(t)
z2(t) = C2x(t) + D2u(t) + D22w2(t)
y(t) = Cx(t), (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn×1 is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rm×1 is the
control input vector, w2(t) ∈ Rm2×1 is the exogenous input,
z2(t) ∈ Rp2×1 is the performance output, and y(t)∈Rp×1 is
the measured output. The matrices A and B are the nominal
values of the state and input matrices, respectively, while ∆A
and ∆B model the respective uncertainties. We make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1: (i) The pair (A,B) is controllable, (C,A) is
observable, (C2,A) is observable.
(ii) ∆A and ∆B have the form [9]
[∆A ∆B] = B1∆δ[C1 D1], (2)
where B1∈Rn×m1 , C1∈Rp1×n, D1∈Rp1×m are known ma-
trices, and ∆δ∈Rm1×p1 is an unknown matrix which is norm-
bounded, satisfying ∆δT∆δ  1/γ2I for any scalar γ > 0.
Assumption 2: Matrices C2 and D2 have the following form:
C2 =
[
C12,0
]
,D2 =
[
0
D22
]
,CT2 D2 = 0. (3)
Using assumptions 1 and 2, the system (1) can be expressed
as the feedback interconnection of the following two subsys-
tems:
Σ :

x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + B1w1(t) + B2w2(t)
z1(t) = C1x(t) + D1u(t)
z2(t) = C2x(t) + D2u(t) + D22w2(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(4)
ΣK :
{
w1(t) = ∆δz1(t), (5)
where z1(t) ∈ Rp1×1, w1(t) ∈ Rm1×1.
Our goal in this section is to find a linear static output-
feedback controller u(t) = −Ky(t) that stabilizes (1), i.e.,
guarantees ||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ. Following [28], this H∞-norm
constraint can be transformed into an Linear Matrix Inequality
(LMI) condition as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The H∞-norm constraint ||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ
holds if and only if there exists an X = XT that satisfies
the LMI[
Acl(K)X + XAcl(K)
T + B1B
T
1 XCcl1(K)
T
Ccl1(K)X −γ2I
]
≺ 0
X  0 (6)
where Acl(K) = A − BKC, Ccli(K) = Ci − DiKC for
i = 1, 2.
The mixed H2/H∞ control problem can then be stated
as: Given an achievable H∞-norm bound γ, find a feedback
controller K ∈ Rm×p that solves
Minimize
K
||Tz2w2(K)||2, (7)
s.t u(t) = −Ky(t)), equation (4) holds, and (8)
||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ (or equivalently, (6) holds). (9)
Tz2w2 is the closed-loop transfer function from w2 to z2.
For simplicitly, and without loss of generality, we set D22 =
0 in (1). Following standard robust control results, such as in
[28], it can be shown that the squared H2 norm from w2 to
z2 for the system (4) is
||Tz2w2(K)||22 = J(K) := trace(BT2 PB2) (10)
where P is the solution of the Lyapunov equation
PAcl(K) + Acl(K)
TP + Ccl2(K)
TCcl2(K) = 0. (11)
We can define
Q = (C12)
TC12  0, R = (D22)TD22  0 (12)
in which case the objective J(K) in (10) can be written as
J(K) =
∫ ∞
t=0
[
xT (t)Qx(t) + uT (t)Ru(t)
]
dt. (13)
B. Sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ control
The solution K in problem (7)-(9) is usually a dense matrix,
meaning that every sensor must send the sensed outputs to
every controller. This can result in a large communication cost.
3To reduce this cost, we impose a sparsity constraint on the
feedback matrix [2], [24], resulting in the following sparsity-
constrained mixed H2/H∞ problem:
min
K
||Tz2w2(K)||2,
s.t. ||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ, card(K) ≤ s, (14)
with the plant model satisfying (4). For simplicity, we define
each nonzero entry in K as one communication link. Alterna-
tive definitions of sparsity and their effects on the actual cost
of communication are discussed in [2].
C. Overview of the centralized PALM algorithm
The sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ problem (14) was
solved in our recent paper [24] using the GraSP algorithm,
assuming that for any given value of s we can find an initial
guess for K that satisfies the s-sparse structure. Depending
on the plant model and the uncertainty in (4), finding such a
feasible initial guess in reality, however, can be quite difficult.
In this section, we eliminate this requirement by introducing a
sparsity-constrained optimization algorithm based on PALM.
For this, we first transform (14) into a problem with two
optimization variables, K and F, where K is defined in (8),
and F represents the sparse feedback matrix that satisfies
the cardinality constraint. The problem (14) can then be
reformulated as follows:
min
K,F
J(K) +
ρ
2
||K− F||2F ,
s.t. ||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ,
card(F) ≤ s, (15)
where the penalty term ρ/2||K−F|2F is used to regularize the
difference between K and F. When the parameter ρ is chosen
large enough, this term can be reduced sufficiently. There are
two constrained variables in (15). We next transform (15) to an
unconstrained optimization problem by defining the following
indicator functions:
g(K) =
{
0, T∞(K) < γ
+∞, O.W. (16)
f(F) =
{
0, card(F) ≤ s
+∞, O.W. (17)
Using (16) and (17) the problem (15) can be written as
min
K,F
Φ(K,F), (18)
where
Φ(K,F) = J(K) + g(K) + f(F) +H(K,F) (19)
with
H(K,F) =
ρ
2
||K− F||2F (20)
being the coupling function between K and F.
The PALM algorithm proceeds by alternating the minimiza-
tion on the variables (K,F) through separate subproblems
[25], which simplifies solving (18), as described below. When
K is fixed, the optimization (18) reduces to minimizing the
sum of a nonsmooth function f(F) and a smooth function
H(K,F) of F. From the result of proximal forward-backward
splitting algorithm [25], minimizing f +H can be relaxed as
iteratively upper bounding the objective and minimizing the
upper bound [29]. The iteration can be written as
Fk+1 = (21)
arg min
F
{
〈F− Fk,∇FH(F,K)〉+ t
2
||F− Fk||2F + f(F)
}
,
where 〈, 〉 denotes inner product. Minimizing the first two
terms is equivalent to minimizing the first order (linear)
approximation of H(K,F) at F = Fk, regularized by a
trust-region penalty near Fk. When t ∈ (L,∞) and L is the
Lipschitz constant (see S.II [30] and Appendix B.3 [31]) for
∇FH(K,F), the regularized linear approximation provides an
upper bound on H(K,F) [29].
Eq. (21) can be rewritten compactly using the definition of
a proximal map as
Fk+1 ∈ proxft
(
Fk − 1/t∇FH(K,Fk)
)
, (22)
where for σ : Rd → (∞,∞], a proper and lower semicontinu-
ous function, x ∈ Rd and t > 0, the proximal map associated
with σ at point x is
proxσt (x) = arg min
u∈Rd
{
σ(u) +
t
2
||u− x||2
}
. (23)
Similar analysis can be carried out for the minimization
of (18) when F is fixed. In summary, the PALM algorithm
minimizes (18) by alternatively finding the proximal maps:
Fk+1 ∈ proxfak
(
Fk − 1/ak∇FH(Kk,Fk)
)
(24)
Kk+1 ∈ proxJ+gbk
(
Kk − 1/bk∇KH(Kk,Fk+1)
)
(25)
where ak and bk are positive constants that are greater than the
Lipschitz constants L1(Kk) and L2(Fk+1) of ∇FH(Kk,F)
and ∇KH(K,Fk+1), respectively.
D. Algorithm description
We summarize the PALM algorithm for sparsity-constrained
mixed H2/H∞ control in Algorithm 1. In Steps 2 and 3 of
Algorithm 1, F-minimization (24) and K-minimization (25)
are performed, respectively. In Step 2, we perform iterative
F-minimization (24), which can be rewritten from (23) as:
Fk+1 = arg min
F
{
f(F) +
ak
2
||F− Zk||2F
}
(26)
where Zk is the point within the parenthesis in (24), found in
Step 2.2. It is easy to see that the partial gradients of H(K,F),
Algorithm 1 PALM algorithm for the mixed H2/H∞ control
algorithm with sparsity constraint
Given s: sparsity constraint, γ: H∞-norm bound.
1. Initialization:
K0: any stabilizing feedback gain with T∞(K0) < γ.
F0: any stabilizing feedback gain F0.
Compute a := γ1ρ, b := γ2ρ.
for k = 1, 2, ...kmax until ||Kk+1−Kk||F < 1 or ||Fk+1−
Fk||F < 2 do
// 2. F-minimization step
2.1 Compute Zk := Fk − 1a∇FH(Kk,Fk)
2.2 Prune Zk: Fk+1 := [Zk]s.
// 3. K-minimization step
3.1 Compute Xk := Kk − 1b∇KH(Kk,Fk+1).
3.2 Update Kk+1: Kk+1 := KPROXOP(Kk,Xk, b).
end for
4defined in (20) are
∇KH(K,F) = ρ(K− F)
∇FH(K,F) = ρ(F−K). (27)
From (27), the Lipschitz constant L1(Kk) = ρ, and thus the
constant ak in (24) and (26) is defined as
ak = a = γ1ρ (28)
with γ1 > 1.
In Step 3 of Algorithm 1, we perform iterative K-
minimization:
Kk+1 = arg min
K
{
J(K) + g(K) +
bk
2
||K−Xk||2F
}
, (29)
which is equivalent to (25), and bk is chosen as bk = b = γ2ρ,
with γ2 > 1.
In the following, we present the solutions for Eq. (26) and
(29) used in Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1.
1) F-minimization: Applying the proximal operator (24) of
function f is equivalent to minimizing a regularized version
of f . In (26), f is an indicator function of the set X =
{F|card(K) ≤ s} (17), so the proximal operator in (26) (Step
2.3 in Algorithm 1) is equivalent to the projection of Zk onto
the set X . Therefore, we can rewrite (26) as
Fk+1 = arg min
F
||F− Zk||2F
s.t. card(F) ≤ s. (30)
As shown in [5], [25], the solution to (30) is [Zk]s (see Table
I), which is Step 2.3 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 KPROXOP: Subroutine to solve (31)
1: procedure KPROXOP(Kcur, Xk, b)
2: while True do
3: Kprev := Kcur
4: if ||∇Kh(Kcur)||F < 3 then
5: // Stationary point in the interior of the H∞-
constraint set.
6: break
7: end if
8: // Take a gradient-descent step in the interior of
the H∞-constraint set.
9: Kcur := Kprev − d∇Kh(Kprev), where step size
d > 0 is chosen by backtracking line search [32] s.t.
T∞(Kcur) < γ
10: if d < 2 then
11: // Kprev is near the boundary of the H∞-
constraint set
12: Solve for Kin using (36). Let ∆Kcur := Kin−
Kprev.
13: Kcur := Kprev + d′∆Kcur, where d′ is deter-
mined by backtracking line search [32].
14: end if
15: if ||Kcur −Kprev||F < 1 then
16: break
17: end if
18: end while
19: end procedure
2) K-minimization: Next we focus on the proximal opera-
tor for (29), which is equivalent to
min
K
h(K)
s.t. T∞(K) < γ (31)
where
h(K) ,
(
J(K) +
bk
2
||K−Xk||2F
)
. (32)
We propose to solve (31) using a feasible direction method in
the search space of K, summarized in Algorithm 2. Starting
from an interior point of the feasible region of the problem (In
step 3.2 of Algorithm 1, Kk always satisfies T∞(Kk) < γ),
the algorithm first descends along the gradient of h(K) until
the solution reaches a stationary point in the interior (line 6)
or on the boundary of the constraint set. When the solution
is in the interior of the feasible region, a gradient-descent
update step is used (line 9). When the current solution is at
the boundary and the gradient-descent direction violates the
H∞-norm constraint, we seek a direction that reduces the
minimization objective and simultaneously moves the solution
away from the boundary of the H∞-norm constraint set to its
interior (lines 12-13 in Algorithm 2).
In lines 12-13, we find the improving feasible direction for
(31) when the solution is at the boundary of the feasible region.
We recall the Zoutendijk’s method [33] as the foundation for
general feasible direction methods, which requires evaluating
the gradients of both the objective and the constraint functions,
i.e., ∇Kh(K) and ∇KT∞(K). In the original formulation
of Zoutendijk’s method (S.I [30], Appendix B.2 in [31]),
the gradient of the constraint function is evaluated to form
conditions for the improving feasible direction. However, due
to the difficulty in evaluating the gradient of an H∞ norm,
we utilize the concept of level sets as in [34], as well as their
LMI interpretation, to develop an alternative condition.
In each step of the Zoutendijk’s method, a linear program-
ming subproblem is solved to find the improving feasible
direction. The inequality trace[(∇Kh(K))T ·∆K] < 0 guar-
antees that an update direction ∆K decreases h(K) in (31).
Moreover, the inequality which involves gradient of the H∞
norm, i.e., trace[(∇K||Tz1w1(K)||∞)T ·∆K] < 0 can be used
to check if ∆K moves away from the H∞ bound. In the gain
space of K ∈ Rm×n, the set of all stabilizing K which satisfy
(6), i.e., with H∞ norm smaller than γ, is a level set
K(γ) := {K| ||Tz1w1(K)||∞ < γ}. (33)
Given a stabilizing gain K0, the algorithm in [34] proceeds
by first finding a sufficiently small γ0 such that K0 ∈ K(γ0).
Next, a convex subset Kˆ(γ0) of K(γ0), which also contains
K0 near the boundary, can be formed using an LMI sufficient
condition. Then an inner point Kin of Kˆ(γ0) is found using
the following sufficient LMI condition.
For the above (K0, γ0), Kin is an inner point of Kˆ(γ0) if
the matrix function G(Kin; K0) is positive definite, i.e.,
G(Kin; K0)  0⇒ Kin ∈ Kˆ(γ0). (34)
The details of computing G(Kin; K0) are provided in [24].
We combine the LMI condition (34) and the gradient of
h(K) in (31) to form the iterative algorithm for solving (31).
5The gradient of h(K) is
∇Kh(K) = 2(RKC−BTP)LCT + bk(K−Xk). (35)
Thus, given a current solution Kcur near the boundary of the
H∞-norm constraint set, an improving feasible point Kin can
be found by solving the following linear matrix inequality:
max
z,Kin
z
s.t. trace[(∇Kh(Kcur))T (Kin −Kcur)] + z ≤ 0
G(Kin; Kcur)− θz · I  0. (36)
The parameter θ ≥ 0 is a predetermined factor that controls
how far K moves away from the H∞-norm boundary. The
value of θ determines the speed of reduction of the H∞ norm,
with a small value of θ resulting in a less aggressive shrinkage
of the H∞ norm. If the solution z∗ in (36) is positive, then
Kin −Kcur is an improving feasible direction; otherwise, an
improving feasible direction cannot be found.
Given the current solution Kcur and the inner point Kin
solved in (36), the update rule is given in lines 12–13 of
Algorithm 2, where d′ ≤ 1 is the step size found by a
backtracking line search using the Armijo condition [33].
III. SPARSITY-CONSTRAINED NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES
FOR MULTI-AGENT CONTROL
A. Multi-agent model and generalized Nash equilibrium
Next, we extend the optimization in Section II to the case
when the agents have different optimization objectives. To
accommodate this scenario, we consider the following multi-
agent system with model uncertainty in A and B matrices.
Consider a network of N agents, where agent i employs
its control strategy ui(t) ∈ Rqi×1, i = 1, ..., N . Thus, (1)
becomes
x˙(t) = (A+∆A)x(t) +
N∑
i=1
(
B(i)+∆B(i)
)
ui(t) + B2w2(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
ui(t) = −Kiy(t), i = 1, ..., N, (37)
where A ∈ Rn×n, B(i) ∈ Rn×qi represent the nominal
values of the state and control matrix, respectively, for the
i-th control input. We assume all agents know A and B(i)
for i = 1, ..., N , and the uncertain matrices ∆A ∈ Rn×n and
∆B , [∆B(1),∆B(2), ...,∆B(N)] satisfy the norm-bounded
assumption (2), where ∆B(i) ∈ Rqi×n. Note that B(i) is
the column block of B in (1), with
∑N
i=1 B(i)ui = Bu, and
Ki ∈ Rqi×p is the row block of K in (8) associated with the
rows corresponding to the control inputs for agent i. Thus, the
multi-agent system can be expressed in the form (4–5), with
the first equation in (4) replaced by
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +
N∑
i=1
B(i)ui(t) + B1w1(t) + B2w2(t). (38)
We introduce the following notation. Let K−i denote the
set of strategies j 6= i, j = 1, ..., N . When agent i chooses
its strategy Ki in (37) given K−i, we refer to the resulting
feedback gain matrix K as {Ki; K−i}.
In the multi-agent system (38), the single performance
output z2 in (1) is replaced by N individual performance
outputs of the agents z2,(i). Assuming that each performance
output z2,(i) = C2,(i)x + D2,(i)ui has a form that satisfies
(3), the H2-cost from w2 to agent i’s performance output can
equivalently be defined as the individual LQR cost of agent i:
Ji(K) =
∫ ∞
t=0
[
xT (t)Qix(t) + u
T
i (t)Riui(t)
]
dt
s.t. w1(t) = 0,w2(t) = δ(t) (39)
where Qi ∈ Rn×n  0 and Ri ∈ Rqi×qi  0 are weight
matrices for state and control input of agent i, respectively,
and w2(t) is an impulse disturbance. Similar to the centralized
case, for stabilization of (37), the joint control strategy K
needs to satisfy (6).
In addition, we are interested in implementing a sparse con-
troller subject to a global sparsity constraint. In the following,
we develop a noncooperative game where agent i is modeled
as a game player, with its strategy given by the control policy
represented by Ki. The joint strategies {K1,K2, ...,KN}
must guarantee stability of the uncertain system (37) with
at most s communication links in total. Thus, the set of
admissible strategies {K1,K2, ...,KN} must satisfy
||Tz1w1({K1,K2, ...,KN})||∞ < γ, (40)
card({K1,K2, ...,KN}) ≤ s, (41)
and the set of feasible strategies for player i, given other
players’ strategies K−i, must satisfy
Gi(K−i) = {Ki|card({Ki; K−i}) ≤ s,
||Tz1w1({Ki; K−i})||∞ < γ. (42)
Given K−i, player i solves the following optimization:
min
Ki
Ji({Ki; K−i})
s.t. Ki ∈ Gi(K−i). (43)
Following [27], we can say that the set of strategies
(K∗1,K
∗
2, ...,K
∗
N ) is a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE)
if
Ji({K∗i ; K∗−i}) ≤ Ji({Ki; K∗−i}), ∀Ki ∈ Gi(K∗−i),
i = 1, ..., N. (44)
In GNE, no user can unitarily deviate from the equilibrium to
improve his utility given that the strategy satisfies the global
constraint [27]. A GNE differs from Nash equilibrium (NE)
due to the presence of global constraints.
B. PALM algorithm for GNE
We propose to solve the generalized Nash strategies (44)
using the best-response dynamic (43) where each player takes
its turn to maximize its payoff based on other players’ strate-
gies. The steps are listed in Algorithm 3. Recall Algorithm 1,
where the tuple K,F was iteratively optimized to solve the
penalized optimization (18). Similarly, given K−i, player i’s
optimization (43) can be written in the penalized form using
indicator functions as
min
Ki,F
Φi(Ki,F; K−i) (45)
with
Φi(Ki,F; K−i) , Ji({Ki; K−i}) + h({Ki; K−i})
+f(F) +H({Ki; K−i},F), (46)
where the indicator functions h(·) and f(·) are given by
(16,17), and the matrix {Ki; K−i} is defined after (38) . In
6this optimization, Ki ∈ Rqi×n is viewed as the feedback
gain of agent i that satisfies ||Tz1w1({Ki; K−i})||∞ < γ, and
F ∈ Rm×n represents the system-wide sparse feedback gain
matrix that satisfies the global sparsity constraint. In the func-
tion Φ(K,F) (18), the variables K and F were of the same
size, and they represented the same global sparsity-constrained
feedback gain. However, when minimizing Φi(Ki,F; K−i)
(45), the variable Ki is the robust feedback gain for player
i while F represents the global feedback gain that satisfies
the sparsity constraint. In the best-response dynamic, in each
round the players take turns to minimize their own respective
Φi functions over Ki and F. The equilibrium point is achieved
when no player can improve its Φi using Ki and F while Kj
is fixed for j 6= i. Note that in the initial best response update
steps, given non-sparse K−i, the minimization objective (45)
cannot drive the coupling function H({Ki; K−i},F) in (20)
to zero. This is because
∑
i 6=j ||Ki − (F)i||2F ≈ 0 only
when K−i approaches the desired level of sparsity, where
(F)i ∈ Rqi×n denotes the row block of F that corresponds to
the feedback gain of the ith player.
The minimization of (45) is similar to the minimization
of (18). Thus, modified Algorithm 1 is used in line 9 of
Algorithm 3 to solve (45). Given its Kli, F
l at iteration l,
the following proximal operators are performed by player i in
the minimization of line 9 of Algorithm 3.
1) F-minimization: :
Compute the proximal point Zk for Fk:
Zk = Fk − 1
a
∇FH(Kk,Fk)
= Fk − γ
a
(Fk − {Kki ; K−i}) (47)
Solve the proximal operator:
Fk+1 = arg min
F
a
2
||F− Zk||2F
s.t. card(F) ≤ s, (48)
and get Fk+1 = [Zk]s, similar to Step 2 of Algorithm 1.
2) K-minimization: :
Algorithm 3 PALM algorithm for computing GNE (44)
1: Given s: global sparsity constraint, γ: H∞-norm bound.
2: Initialization:
3: K0: any stabilizing feedback gain with T∞(K0) < γ.
4: F0: any stabilizing feedback gain F0.
5: for l = 1...lmax until ||F1 − Fl−1||F < 3 do
6: Kl := Kl−1, Fl := Fl−1
7: for i = 1...N do
8: // Solve using (47–50) with Kli, F
l as the initial
values:
9: Kˆi, Fˆ = arg minKi,F Φi(Ki,F; K
l
−i)
10: // Update Kl and Fl:
11: Kl = {Kˆi; Kl−i}
12: Fl = Fˆ
13: end for
14: end for
15: Output: KGNE(s) := Fl.
Compute proximal point Xki for Ki:
Xki = K
k
i −
1
b
∇KiH(Kki − (Fk+1)i)
= Kki −
ρ
b
(Kki − (Fk+1)i). (49)
Solve the proximal operator:
Kk+1i = arg min
Ki
{
Ji({Ki; K−i}) + b
2
||Ki −Xki ||2F
}
s.t. ||Tz1w1({Ki; K−i})||∞ < γ. (50)
Solving (50) is similar to solving (31). In (50), player i
aims to update its control strategy Ki given other players’
strategies K−i. Algorithm 2 is applied to solve (50) with
several modifications. The minimization cost in (50) is defined
as hi(Ki,K−i) , Ji({Ki; K−i}) + b2 ||Ki −Xki ||2F , and the
gradient with respect to Ki in line 4 of Algorithm 2 is replaced
by
∇Kihi(Ki,K−i) = (51)
2(RiKiC−BT(i)P(Ki,K−i))L(Ki,K−i)CT + b(Ki−Xki )
where L(Ki,K−i) and P (Ki,K−i) are the solution of the
following set of equations:
(A¯cl(Ki,K−i))TP (Ki,K−i) + P (Ki,K−i)A¯cl(Ki,K−i)
+ Q¯i(Ki,K−i) = 0
A¯cl(Ki,K−i)L(Ki,K−i) +L(Ki,K−i)(A¯cl(Ki,K−i))T
+B2B
T
2 = 0 (52)
and
A¯cl(Ki,K−i) = A−
∑
j 6=i
B(j)KjC−B(i)KiC (53)
Q¯i(Ki,K−i) = Qi + CT (
∑
j 6=i
(Kj)
TRjKj + K
T
i RiKi)C.
Qi and Ri are defined in (39). Similar to lines 10–14 in Algo-
rithm 2, when player i’s strategy Kcuri is near the boundary of
the H∞-norm constraint given other players’ strategies K−i,
an improving feasible direction for Ki can be found by solving
an LMI such as (36) for scalar z and Kini ∈ Rqi×n:
Maximize
z,Kini
z
s.t. trace[(∇Kihi(Kcuri ,K−i)T (Kini −Kcuri )] + z ≤ 0
G
({Kini ; K−i}; {Kcuri ; K−i})− θz · I  0. (54)
Here, θ is the factor to control the speed of reduction of H∞
norm, and G is defined as in (34). Then the update direction
of Ki can be formed as ∆Ki = Kini −Kcuri . We note that in
K-minimization step, each player updates its own strategy Ki,
while in F-minimization step, the strategies of all the players
are jointly updated. Thus, Algorithm 3 has partially distributed
computation.
Finally, we note that the centralized problem (14) can be
represented as a potential game by modifying the noncoop-
erative game (44). A game {N, {Ai}, {Ji}} with N players,
action set {Ai}Ni=1 and utilities {Ji}Ni=1, is an exact potential
game [35] if there exists a global function Φ, such that for
every player i ∈ N , a−i ∈ A−i and a′i, a
′′
i ∈ Ai,
Ji(a
′
i, a−i)− Ji(a
′′
i , a−i) = Φ(a
′
i, a−i)− Φ(a
′′
i , a−i). (55)
We employ a common assumption that the input penalty of
each user is uncorrelated, i.e., uTRu =
∑N
i=1 u
T
i R(i)ui,
where R(i) is the submatrix of R that represents the weight
7x˙i = Aiixi +
X
j 6=i
elˆ(i,j)xj
+Biui
player 1
player 2
Fig. 1: The 5-node open-loop unstable network
matrix for ui(t). Thus, the objective J(K) in (13) can be
expressed as
J(K) = J({Ki,K−i}) = (56)∫ ∞
0
xT
Q + CT (∑
j 6=i
KTj R(j)Kj)C
x+uTi R(i)ui
 dt,
with ui = −Kiy. Thus, the minimization objectives
Ji({Ki; K−i}) of all players in (43) are replaced by the global
LQR cost (56). To convert the game in (43) into an exact
potential game, we set Qi = Q + CT (
∑
j 6=i K
T
j R(j)Kj)C,
Ri = R(i) in the individual cost (39), which is consistent with
(56). The GNE strategies K∗1,K
∗
2, ...,K
∗
N for the potential
game can be written as
J({K∗i ; K∗−i}) ≤ J({Ki; K∗−i}),
∀Ki ∈ Gi(K∗−i), i = 1, ..., N. (57)
We employ Algorithm 3 to compute (57). Players update their
control strategies in the K-minimization step distributively,
and jointly update their strategies in the F-minimization step,
thereby obtaining a partially distributed implementation of the
centralized sparsity-constrained problem (14).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
A. Network model
We consider an example of an uncertain network model
from [36]. The network consists of N connected nodes dis-
tributed randomly on a L unit by L unit square area. Each node
is an unstable second-order system coupled with other nodes
through an exponentially decaying function of the Euclidean
distance lˆ(i, j) [1], [36]. The state-space representation of node
i is given as:[
x˙1i
x˙2i
]
=Aˆii
[
x1i
x2i
]
+
∑
j 6=i
e−lˆ(i,j)
[
x1j
x2j
]
+
[
0
1
]
(di + ui). (58)
In the above state-space representation, the state matrix
Aˆii, i = 1, ..., N and the Euclidean distances lˆ(i, j) are not
known exactly. In particular,
Aˆii = Aii + Aii 
[
θ11 θ12
θ21 θ22
]
lˆ(i, j) = l(i, j) · (1 + δi,j), (59)
where Aii and l(i, j) are the nominal values, and δij and θij
are independent random perturbations, uniformly distributed
in the range ±20%. The operator  denotes element-wise
multiplication. As in (1), A denotes the nominal value of
the state matrix of this N -node unstable system, and Aˆ
denotes one realization of the perturbed state matrix. The
uncertain matrix ∆A = Aˆ − A in (1). The control input
matrix is assumed to be known for this example, so that
Bˆ = B = 1N⊗Bii, where Bii =
[
0 1
]T
, and ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product [37]. In this simulation study, we collected
200 random samples of Aˆ. To guarantee closed-loop stability
of (58), we numerically compute the worst-case Aˆ as,
Aˆworst = arg max
Aˆ
σmax(Aˆ−A). (60)
Using the singular value decomposition, we obtain
USV T=Aˆworst−A. Normalizing S by σmax(S), we
set B1 =
√
σmax(S)U , C1 =
√
σmax(S)V
T in (2). Due to
this normalization, γ = 1.
The following parameters are employed in the simulations.
We set L = 2 and N = 5, thus A ∈ R10×10, B ∈ R10×5.
The output matrix C = I10. The dense feedback matrix K has
card(K) = 50. When the feedback controller is completely
decentralized, i.e., feedback links only exist between states
and controllers within the same node, card(K) = 10. The
performance index for the LQR cost employs Q = 100 · I
and R = I in (12) for the centralized problem (14). For the
noncooperative game (44), we consider a two-player game
as shown in Figure 1, where player 1 is in charge of the
control inputs in nodes 1 and 3 and player 2 is in charge
of the control inputs in nodes 2, 4, 5. The performance index
matrices Qi,Ri, i = 1, 2 for the LQR cost in (39) satisfy:
xTQ1x+u
T
1 R1u1 = 100[(x11−x13)2+(x21−x23)2]+u21+u23
xTQ2x + u
T
2 R2u2 = 100
∑
j=2,4,5
(x21j + x
2
2j) +
∑
j=2,4,5
u2j .
(61)
We solve all the LMIs using the CVX package [38].
B. Social optimization
First, we present simulation results for the problem (14)
applied to the system in (58) with γ = 1 in (14) over
a range of s-values. We implement Algorithm 1, with the
resulting feedback matrix denoted as K∗palm(s). For the same
problem (14), we also use Algorithm 3 applied to the potential
game (57), with the solution denoted by K∗PALMPG(s), given
the sparsity constraint s. For comparison, we also run the
GraSP algorithm that was used in [24], with the resulting
feedback denoted by K∗GraSP(s), initialized by a stabilizing
decentralized controller Kdec with card(Kdec) = 10. In
general, GraSP needs to be initialized by a K0 that satisfies
card(K0) ≤ s and T∞(K0) < γ, which in reality might
be difficult to find. In contrast, the PALM-based Algorithm 1
of this paper does not rely on any such sparse initialization.
Finally, we show performance of the dense mixed H2/H∞
controller using the simple gradient method in [28].
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal LQR cost J in problem (14)
and the associated H∞ norm vs. sparsity constraint s. For
15 ≤ s ≤ 50, the centralized Algorithm 1 and the potential
game using Algorithm 3 both converge to a solution with
sufficiently small coupling function in (18), which indicates
F ≈ K. From Figure 2(a), we observe that the H2 norms
of all sparsity-constrained methods decrease as s is relaxed,
and approach to that of the dense controller [4]. However, the
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Fig. 2: The LQR cost J and H∞ norm vs. sparsity constraint s.
PALM-based methods have similar LQR costs and outperform
significantly the greedy GraSP algorithm in [24]. In GraSP,
the choice of active coordinates only depends on the gradient
information of the function J . At convergence, the solution of
the mixed H2/H∞ problem has the sparsity structure given
by the greedy selection step. For the PALM algorithm, since
we iteratively compute the proximal map on Xk and Zk,
the support is chosen based on the information on both the
LQR cost J(K) and the H∞-norm constraint T∞(K). Thus,
at convergence, the PALM method finds a critical point of
problem (14) while GraSP does not necessarily achieve it.
Figure 2(b) shows the H∞ norms of K∗PALM(s), K
∗
PALMPG(s)
and K∗GraSP(s). We observe that for both GraSP and PALM
methods, the solution is found in the interior of the H∞-norm
constraint for s ≥ 30, and on the boundary for s ≤ 25, which
indicates that when the sparsity constraint becomes more
stringent, satisfying the sparsity and H∞-norm constraints
simultaneously becomes challenging.
Both Algorithm 1 (the social optimization) and Algorithm 3
(the potential game) are found to converge for all s-values for
this system. Figure 3 shows the error in consecutive steps for
variable K at the end of step 3 of Algorithm 1 as a function of
iteration step, for different s-values. We found that ∆Fk has
a similar trend to ∆Kk. The errors in consecutive steps are
defined as ∆Kk , Kk −Kk−1 and ∆Fk , Fk − Fk−1. We
note that the error converges faster for larger s-values, which
might be explained by the fact that that for s > 25, the minima
are found in the interior of the H∞-norm constraint set (see
Figure 2). For Algorithm 3 (potential game), the penalized
cost function Φi and ||K − F||2F (line 9) have similar trends
to those for Algorithm 1. Moreover, it is demonstrated in Fig
4 that although Algorithm 1 converges to a critical point of
Φ(K,F), the coupling function H(K,F) > 0 for s < 15.
As a result, when Algorithm 1 converges for these s-values,
K 6= F, so a sparse feedback solution that satisfies (14) cannot
be found. Thus, in Figure 2, we only show the LQR cost and
H∞-norm for 15 ≤ s ≤ 50.
C. The noncooperative game
We investigate performance of Algorithm 3 for the noncoop-
erative game with different individual costs (61) for the system
(58). We use KGNE(s) = {KGNE1 (s),KGNE2 (s)} to denote
the two players’ feedback produced by Algorithm 3 when the
sparsity constraint is given by s. Figure 5 shows the errors in
consecutive steps of player i’s strategic variables Ki,Fi for
i = 1, 2 vs iteration round l in Algorithm 3. We observe that
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function ||Kk−Fk||2F vs iteration k in the end of Step 3 of Algorithm
1 for multiple s-values.
both ||∆Ki||F and ||∆Fi||F decrease significantly within the
first 10 iterations and then saturate to small values as l grows,
resulting in the saturation of the penalized cost function Φi in
line 9 of Algorithm 3, which corresponds to an approximate
equilibrium point as discussed in section IV-D. The normalized
coupling function 1ρH(K
l,Fl) = ||Kl −Fl||2F (20) decreases
with iteration l, following the trend in Figure 4. For s > 20,
the square error ||Kl−Fl||2F reaches a sufficiently small value
(< 10−4) at the equilibrium point, while for s ≤ 20, the
square error is larger, causing T∞(KGNE(s)) > T∞(Kl),
which results in T∞(KGNE(s)) > 1 during convergence. One
way to avoid this discrepency and still guarantee closed-loop
stability is to replace γ in (16) with γ−, and provide a margin
that compensates for the square error between K and F. For
this example, we set  = 0.01, so that T∞(KGNE(s)) < 0.99.
Figure 6 illustrates the individual LQR costs Ji as in (39),
and the global H∞ norm when KGNE(s) is implemented.
We observe that in Figure 6(a), for each player i, the LQR
cost achieved at the equilibrium point Ji(KGNE(s)) tends
to decrease with s, which indicates that there is a trade-off
between the selfish LQR cost and the global shared sparsity
constraint. Figure 6(b) shows that T∞(KGNE(s)) < 1 for
15 ≤ s ≤ 45, indicating that the Nash strategies in KGNE(s)
are guaranteed to stabilize the uncertain system (58).
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Fig. 6: The individual LQR cost and global H∞ norm of KGNE(s)
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for different s values.
D. Algorithm Convergence and Complexity
We close this section by providing some final comments
about the convergence properties and complexity of the pro-
posed algorithms. Global convergence of PALM for noncon-
vex nonsmooth functions was studied in [25], while that of
PALM-based output feedback co-design under block-sparsity
constraints was established in [5]. Results in [5], [25] are
extended to analyze the convergence properties of Algorithm
1 in [30], [31]. It has been proven in [Bolte et al., 2014] that
if Lemma 2–4 in [30] hold, then the sequence generated by
PALM algorithm globally converges. In addition, if Lemma 5
of [30] holds, the sequence converges to a critical point [Bolte
et al., 2014] of Φ. This confirms convergence of Algorithm
1 to a sparsity-constrained mixed H2/H∞ controller, which
corresponds to a critical point of Φ under mild assumptions
on the functions J and g.
Next, we briefly discuss the convergence properties of
Algorithm 3. Suppose a GNE (44) is given by (K∗1, ...,K
∗
N ).
Then the following condition holds for each player i [39]:
∇Gi(K∗−i),ηJi({K∗i ; K∗−i}) = 0, (62)
where ∇Gi(K∗−i),ηJi({Ki; K∗−i}) is the projected gradient of
cost Ji (39) onto the constraint set Gi (42) for player i, i =
1, ..., N . Again, from [39], we can write
∇Gi(K∗−i),ηJi({Ki; K∗−i}) ,
1
η
(Ki −ΠGi(K∗−i)[Ki − η∇KiJi({Ki,K∗−i})]) (63)
where η > 0 and the operator ΠK(·) denotes projection onto
the set K.
Similarly, in line 9 of Algorithm 3, a necessary condition
for Φi to achieve its minimum is that the projected gradient
∇Gi(Kl−i),ηJi({Ki; Kl−i}) = 0. Instead of seeking an exact
equilibrium point as GNE, we assume convergence of Al-
gorithm 3 when this projected gradient is sufficiently small,
which is a necessary condition for an approximate local equi-
librium [39]. At iteration l, the Kˆi in line 9 can be viewed as an
approximation of ΠGi(Kl−i)[K
l−1
i − η∇KiJi({Kl−1i ,Kl−i)}].
Thus, the norm of the projected gradient is proportional to
||Kli −Kl−1i ||, implying that small values of ∆Kli and ∆Fli
indicate convergence of Algorithm 3. This is illustrated in
Figure 5. Moreover, we note that there is no theoretical
guarantee for the existence of GNE for the game in (43). If a
GNE exists for the potential game (57) then this GNE satisfies
the necessary condition for the minimizer of (14).
The main numerical complexity of Algorithms 1 and 3 is
dominated by the K-minimization step (Step 3 of Algorithm 1
and line 9 of Algorithm 3), which has polynomial complexity
on the number of variables in the feedback matrix [40].
V. CONCLUSION
The PALM method was exploited to solve the sparsity-
constrained mixed H2/H∞ control problem for multi-agent
systems. First, a centralized social-optimization algorithm
was investigated. Second, we developed noncooperative and
potential games that have partially-distributed computation.
The proposed algorithms were validated using an open-loop
unstable network dynamic system. It was demonstrated that
the centralized PALM method outperforms the GraSP-based
method for most sparsity levels, and converges both theo-
retically as well as in simulation results. Moreover, a best-
response dynamics algorithm for the proposed games con-
verges to an approximate GNE point. The performance of the
potential game for social optimization closely approximates
that of the centralized algorithm.
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S.I: OVERVIEW OF ZOUTENDIJK’S METHOD
The Zoutendijk’s method [Bazaraa et al., 2013] is an ap-
proach to constrained optimization, where an improving fea-
sible direction is generated by solving a subproblem, usually a
linear program. We briefly overview Zoutendijk’s method for
the case of nonlinear inequality constraints.
Consider the following constrained optimization problem:
Minimize f(x)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m , (S1)
where x ∈ Rn×1 and f(x) and gi(x) are differentiable at x. At
point x, I is the set of active constraint I = {i|gi(x) = 0}. An
improving feasible direction d can be found by the following
linear programming problem [Bazaraa et al., 2013]:
Maximize
z,d
z
s. t. ∇f(x)Td + z ≤ 0,
∇gi(x)Td + z ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I,
−1 ≤ dj ≤ 1, ∀j = 1, ..., n, (S2)
where the third normalizing constraint prevents the optimal z
from approaching∞. It was shown [Bazaraa et al., 2013] that
if the optimal value of z, denoted as z∗, satisfies z∗ > 0, then
d is an improving direction since d satisfies ∇f(x)Td < 0
and ∇gi(x)Td < 0 ∀i ∈ I . Otherwise if z∗ = 0, then the
current x is a Fritz John point [Bazaraa et al., 2013], which
satisfies the necessary condition for the local minimum of (S1).
S.II: DEFINITIONS OF TERMS IN SECTION II-C
Definition 1. (Lipschitz constant) A function f : Rd → R
with the gradient function ∇f is Lipschitz continuous with
Lipschitz constant L on S ∈ Rd if ||∇f(x) − ∇f(y)|| ≤
L||x− y|| for all x,y ∈ S [Bazaraa et al., 2013].
Definition 2. (Proper) The function σ : S → R is a proper
function if σ(x) > −∞ for all x ∈ S , and σ(x) < ∞ for at
least one point x ∈ S.
Definition 3. (Lower semicontinuous) The function σ : S →
R is lower semicontinuous at x¯ ∈ S if for all  > 0 there exists
a δ such that x ∈ S and ||x−xˆ|| < δ imply σ(x)−σ(x¯) > −.
S.III: NOTATION USED IN KURDYKA-ŁOJASIEWICZ (KL)
PROPERTY, EMPLOYED IN CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF
ALGORITHM 1
Definition 4. (Distance.) For any subset S ⊂ Rd and any
point x ∈ Rd, the distance from x to S is defined and denoted
by
dist(x,S) := inf{||y − x|| : y ∈ S}. (S3)
When S = ∅, we have dist(x,S) =∞ for all x.
Let η ∈ [0,∞]. We denote by Φη the class of all concave
and continuous functions ϕ : [0, η) → R+ which satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) ϕ(0) = 0.
(ii) ϕ has first-order continous derivative on (0, η) and conti-
nous at 0;
(iii) for all s ∈ (0, η) : ϕ′(s) > 0.
For proper and lower semicontinous functions, the subdiffer-
entials are defined below [Bolte et al., 2014]:
Definition 5. (Subdifferentials) Let σ : Rd → (−∞,∞] be a
proper and lower semicontinous function.
(i) For a given x ∈ domσ, the Fre´chet subdifferential of σ at
x, written as ∂ˆσ(x), is the set of all vectors u ∈ Rd which
satisfy
lim
y 6=x
inf
y→x
σ(y)− σ(x)− 〈u,y − x〉
||y − x|| ≥ 0. (S4)
When x /∈ domσ, we set ∂ˆσ(x) = ∅.
(ii) The limiting subdifferential, or subdifferential, of σ at x ∈
Rd, written ∂σ(x), is defined as
∂σ(x) :=
{
u ∈ Rd : ∃xk → x, σ(xk)→ σ(x) (S5)
and uk ∈ ∂ˆσ(xk)→ u as k →∞
}
. (S6)
Points whose subdifferentials contains 0 are called (limiting-
)critical points.
Definition 6. (Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz (KL) Property) Let σ :
Rd → (−∞,+∞] be proper and lower semicontinuous.
(i) The function σ is said to have the Kurdyka-Łojasiewicz
(KL) Property at u¯ ∈ dom ∂σ := {u ∈ Rd : ∂σ(u) 6= ∅} if
there exist η ∈ (0,∞], a neighorhood U of u¯ and a function
ϕ ∈ Φη , such that for all
u ∈ U ∩ [σ(u¯) < σ(u) < σ(u¯) + η] , (S7)
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the following inequality holds
ϕ′(σ(u)− σ(u¯)) dist(0, ∂σ(u)) ≥ 1. (S8)
(ii) If σ satisfies the KL property at each point of dom ∂σ,
then σ is called a KL function.
It is shown in [Bolte et al., 2014] that KL functions arise
in many applications for optimization, in particular, semi-
algebraic functions are KL functions. The definitions for semi-
algebraic function is given as follows.
Definition 7. (Semi-algebraic sets and functions). (i) A subset
S ∈ Rd is real semi-algebraic set if there exists a finite number
of real polynomial functions gij , hij : Rd → R such that
S = ∪pj=1 ∩qi=1
{
u ∈ Rd : gij(u) = 0 and hij(u) < 0
}
.
(S9)
(ii) A function h : Rd → (−∞,+∞] is called semi-algebraic
if its graph {
(u, t) ∈ Rd+1 : h(u) = t} (S10)
is a semi-algebraic subset of Rd+1.
S.IV: PROOF OF GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF ALGORITHM
1
In this section, we employ results from [Lin and Adetola,
2017], [Bolte et al., 2014] to analyze convergence of Algo-
rithm 1. To simplify notation, we define g˜(K) , J(K)+g(K),
where J(K) is the performance index of H2 cost (10) and
g(K) is the indicator function for the H∞ constraint (16).
Lemma 2: g˜ : Rm×p → (−∞,∞] and f : Rm×p →
(−∞,∞] are proper and lower semicontinuous functions.
Proof. In problem (18) the function J(K) is the LQR cost
when using the feedback gain K. Clearly f(K) > −∞, and
J(K) < +∞ if K is stabilizing, thus function J is proper. In
addition, J(K) is continuous in K [Rautert and Sachs, 1997],
and therefore lower semicontinuous.
The function g(K) in (16) is the indicator function for the
level set K(γ) in (33), and thus can take either 0 or +∞, with
g(K) = 0 whenever K ∈ K(γ). Thus, g˜(K) is proper. In
addition, g(K) is an indicator function of an open set, thus it
is lower semicontinuous. Given J and g are both proper and
lower semicontinuous, the summation g˜ = J + g is proper
and lower semicontinuous. Similarly, f(F) in (17) is a proper
function. Moreover, it is shown in [Bolte et al., 2014] that it
is lower semicontinuous.
Lemma 3: H : Rm×p × Rm×p → R is a continuously
differentiable function, i.e., H ∈ C1.
Proof. The gradient of H(K,F) (27) is countinous in K,F.
Thus, H ∈ C1.
Lemma 4: (i) infRm×p,Rm×p Φ > −∞, infRm×p f > −∞,
and infRm×p g˜ > −∞, where Φ is given by (19).
(ii) The partial gradient ∇KH(K,F) is globally Lipschitz
with moduli L1(F), that is [Bolte et al., 2014],
||∇KH(K1,F)−∇KH(K2,F)|| ≤ L1(F)||K1 −K2||.
Likewise, the partial gradient ∇FH(K,F) is globally Lips-
chitz with moduli L2(K).
(iii) There exist bounds λ−i , λ
+
i , i = 1, 2 such that
inf{L1(Fk) : k ∈ N} ≥ λ−1 , inf{L2(Kk) : k ∈ N} ≥ λ−2
sup{L1(Fk) : k ∈ N} ≤ λ+1 , sup{L2(Kk) : k ∈ N} ≤ λ+2
(S11)
(iv) ∇H , (∇KH,∇FH) is Lipschitz continuous [Luen-
berger and Ye, 1984] on bounded subsets of Rm×p × Rm×p.
That is, for each bounded subset B1 × B2 of Rm×p × Rm×p
there exists M > 0, such that for all (Ki,Fi) ∈ (B1,B2),
||∇KH(K1,F1)−∇KH(K2,F2)||2F
+||∇FH(K1,F1)−∇FH(K2,F2)||2F
≤M(||K1 −K2||2F + ||F1 − F2||2F ) (S12)
Proof. (i)–(iv) are stated as assumptions in [Bolte et al.,
2014]. We show that these assumptions hold for our sparsity-
constrained mixed H2/H∞ problem. It is easy to see that
(i) holds since f and g are indicator functions. Since J is
the LQR performance index, J(K) > 0. Thus g˜(K) > −∞.
In (20), H(K,F) ≥ 0, so Φ(K,F) > −∞. Properties (ii)
and (iii) require the partial gradient of H to be globally
Lipschitz, and the Lipschitz constant be upper and lower
bounded, which is easy to verify since L1(Fk) = L2(Kk) = ρ
(27). Property (iv) holds since the left-hand side of (S12) can
be expressed as: LHS = 2ρ2||(K1 −K2)− (F1 − F2)||2F ≤
4ρ2(||K1 −K2||2F + ||F1 − F2||2F ).
Assumption 1: Function J is a semi-algebraic function [Bolte
et al., 2014].
Lemma 5: The objective function Φ of (18) is a Kurdyka-
Łojasiewicz (KL) function [Bolte et al., 2014].
Remark 1. A broad class of functions satisfy the semi-
algebraic property, including polynomial functions, `0-norm
function and indicator function of positive semidefinite cones
[Bolte et al., 2014]. The function f(F) is the indicator function
for the semi-algebraic set {F|card(F) ≤ s}. Thus, function f
is semi-algebraic [Lin and Adetola, 2017], [Bolte et al., 2014].
The function g(K) is the indicator function for the level set
K(γ), which is approximated by the convex level set Kˆ(γ0),
represented by the LMI (34), and Kˆ(γ0) is a semi-algebraic
set [Netzer, 2016]. The coupling function H is polynomial,
so it is semi-algebraic [Bolte et al., 2014]. Moreover, J is a
semi-algebraic function by Assumption 1. Thus, each term of
Φ is semi-algebraic, and since a finite sum of semi-algebraic
functions is also semi-algebraic, Φ is semi-algebraic. It is
shown in Theorem 5.1 in [Bolte et al., 2014] that a semi-
algebraic function satisfies the KL property at any point in its
domain. Thus, Φ is KL.
It has been proved in [Bolte et al., 2014] that if Lemma
2–4 hold, then the sequence generated by PALM algorithm
globally converges. In addition, if Lemma 5 holds, the se-
quence converges to a critical point [Bolte et al., 2014] of
Φ. This confirms convergence of Algorithm 1 to a sparsity-
constrained mixed H2/H∞ controller, which corresponds to
a critical point of Φ under mild assumptions on the functions
J and g.
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